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Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements 
 
Summary 
We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides 
being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in 
increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water 
allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate 
change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a 
decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the 
stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a 
fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. 
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When multiple countries share a river, they compete over available water
resources. The upstream country has the ﬁrst option to use water, which
may obstruct the overall eﬃciency of water use [5]. Cooperation between
upstream and downstream countries—in the form of a water allocation
agreement—may increase the eﬃciency of water use. Whether cooperation
isstable,however,dependsonthedesignofthewaterallocationagreement.
The stability of water allocation agreements is the subject of this paper.
In the twentieth century, 145 international agreements on water use in
transboundary rivers were signed; almost 50% of these agreements cover
water allocation issues [43]. The majority of these water allocation agree-
ments does not take into account the hydrologic variability of river ﬂow
[19]. This is a shortcoming because variabilityis an important characteristic
of river ﬂow. This variability will even increase in many river basins when
the eﬀects of climate change on temperature and precipitation proceed as
projected by climate simulation models [23]. These eﬀects are expected to
increase the variability of the annual and seasonal ﬂow patterns as well as
the frequency of extreme events in many river basins [3, 13, 38, 40]. Recog-
nition of ﬂow variability in the design of water allocation agreements can
increase the eﬃciency of these agreements.
Several studies have addressed this issue for two common sharing rules
forwaterallocation: proportionalallocationandﬁxedﬂowallocation[foran
overview of sharing rules, see 15]. Fixed ﬂow allocations are most common
[43] but tend to be less eﬃcient when ﬂow variability increases. Bennett
et al. [8] compared the eﬃciency of ﬁxed ﬂow allocations with proportional
allocations and found that, in many situations, proportional allocations
are more eﬃcient. Kilgour and Dinar [26, 27] developed a sharing rule
3that ensures a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation for every possible ﬂow volume,
where the level of compensation paid by receivers of water is subject to
annual bargaining. Obviously, compared with a proportional or ﬁxed ﬂow
allocation, this ﬂexible allocation is more eﬃcient, but it requires accurate
predictions of annual river ﬂow. In a case study of the Colorado river,
Mendelsohn and Bennett [34] found that the loss of eﬃciency related to a
change in mean river ﬂow (e.g. because of climate change) is higher for a
proportional allocation than for a ﬁxed allocation, the main reason being
that the initial proportions used were ineﬃcient. Another result was that
the largest impact of climate change on eﬃciency comes from changes in
the mean of river ﬂow, not from changes in its variance. Furthermore, in an
analysis of U.S. interstate water allocation compacts, Bennett and Howe [7]
found that agreement compliance is higher for proportional than for ﬁxed
ﬂow allocations.
Apartfrombeingeﬃcient,waterallocationagreementsneedtobestable
in order to be eﬀective instruments to increase the eﬃciency of water use.
Eﬃciency and stability of agreements are not necessarily linked. Climate
change, for instance, may increase the beneﬁts of cooperation to one coun-
try while decreasing those of the other, leaving overall eﬃciency equal, but
possibly giving the country with decreased beneﬁts an incentive to leave
the agreement. Because agreements are signed between sovereign nations,
there is usually no higher level authority that can enforce compliance. The
stability of agreements therefore depends on the distribution of the beneﬁts
ofcooperationtothecountriesinvolved, whichcanbeanalysedusinggame
theory. Recent studies [1, 41, 29, 20, 44] showed that water allocation agree-
ments can improve the eﬃciency of water use and that—when beneﬁts of
cooperation are distributed properly—they can be attractive to all coun-
4tries involved. This game theoretic literature, however, does not explicitly
consider the eﬀects of climate change on river ﬂow and agreement stability.
The objective of this paper is to assess the stability of water allocation
agreements when climate change aﬀects river ﬂow. This is done by con-
structing a game theoretic model of water allocation that analyses stability
of three sharing rules for water allocation. Results show that both a de-
crease in mean river ﬂow and an increase in variance of river ﬂow decrease
stability, and that an agreement where the downstream country is allocated
a ﬁxed amount of water has the lowest stability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In sections two and
three we present our model and assess stability of cooperation. In section
fourweillustratetheeﬀectsofclimatechangeonthestabilityofcooperation
for diﬀerent sharing rules, using a numerical example. In section ﬁve we
assess stability eﬀects of alternative punishment strategies and asymmetric
countries. In section six we discuss the results using agreements in the Nile
river basin, the Orange river basin, and the South Saskatchewan river basin
as illustrations, and we conclude in section seven.
2 A model of cooperation
Ariverissharedbytwocountriesi ∈ {u,d},havingitssourceintheupstream
country u and subsequently ﬂowing through the downstream country d.
Qt denotes the volume of river ﬂow in year t that is available for use; it
excludes the river ﬂow necessary to sustain the environmental functioning
of the river system and other vital services such as navigation. Qt is deﬁned
by probability density function f(Q) [cf. 28]; contributions to the river ﬂow
in d are negligible as are return ﬂows. Climate change eﬀects on river ﬂow
5areincludedinthemodelbyadaptingtheprobabilitydensityfunctionfrom
f(Q) to f0(Q).
In year t, country i uses qi,t units of water. Because of the unidirectional
ﬂow of water, u has the ﬁrst option to use water, which may limit water use
by d. All water that was not used by u, is available for use by d:
0 ≤ qu,t ≤ Qt (1)
0 ≤ qd,t ≤ Qt − qu,t (2)
BeneﬁtsBi,t(qi,t)fromwateruseareconcavewithamaximumat ¯ qi,t. Clearly,
if u maximizes beneﬁts of water use, it does not have an incentive to pass
watertodthathasapositivemarginalvaluetohim. Yet, ifthebeneﬁttodof
using more water outweighs the decrease in beneﬁts to u, there is scope for
cooperation, with u passing on water to d. There are many sharing rules to
allocate water between countries. We analyse three common sharing rules:
Proportional allocation (PA): u receives αQt and d receives (1 − α)Qt, with
0 < α < 1;
Fixed upstream allocation (FU): u receives min{β,Qt} and d receives
max{Qt − β,0}, with 0 < β < E(Qt);
Fixed downstream allocation (FD): ureceivesmax{Qt−γ,0}anddreceives
min{γ,Qt}, with 0 < γ < E(Qt).
For cooperation to be attractive to u, we need to include non-water
transfers mt paid by d to u. These non-water transfers may be monetary or
in-kind transfers. There are ample examples of such non-water transfers
related to river basin agreements [6]. We assume that non-water transfers
are equal to the expected value of compensation of u for beneﬁts foregone
6and a share  of the additional beneﬁts from cooperation. The non-water













with 0 ≤  ≤ 1 (3)
where superscript c denotes cooperation, n denotes non-cooperation, and
water use—and therefore beneﬁts—depends on the sharing rule agreed
upon.
This method to calculate non-water transfers is related to the Nash bar-
gaining solution; a common solution concept from non-cooperative game
theory. TheNashbargainingsolutionofagamemaximizes(xu−zu)(xd−zd),
subject to xu,xd ∈ F, where F is the feasible set of payoﬀ vectors and
z = (zu,zd) are non-cooperative payoﬀs [cf. 36]. Here, the calculated non-
water transfers equal the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.1
We analyse the stability of cooperation using an inﬁnitely repeated
game—a common approach in the analysis of international environmen-
tal agreements [cf. 17]—because water allocation agreements typically do
not have a speciﬁed termination date. The stage game in year t is played
as follows. First, a value of Qt is realized from its probability distribution.
Second, the countries observe Qt and simultaneously choose their action:
u chooses qu,t and d chooses mt. If complying with the agreement, u plays
qu,t = qc
u,t according to the selected sharing rule, and earns Bc
u,t = Bu,t(qc
u,t).
If deviating, u plays qu,t = qn
u,t = min{¯ qu,t,Qt}, and earns Bn
u,t = Bu,t(qn
u,t).
If complying with the agreement, d plays mt = mc. If deviating, d plays
mt = mn = 0. Third, countries observe the strategy played by the other
country and receive payoﬀs.2
1Two alternative methods to calculate non-water transfers are the Shapley value and
Nucleolus, solution concepts from cooperative game theory.
2Alternatively, one could assume a Stackelberg game where u is the leader and d is the









We assume that both countries use trigger strategies: when a country de-
viates, it is punished by the other country in the form of p periods non-
cooperative play of the stage game, after which countries return to cooper-
ative play (i.e. agreement strategies). Hence, the expected payoﬀ streams
to u and d for compliance in year t equal:
E(Πc
u,t) = Bc




u,τ) + mc] (5)
E(Πc
d,t) = Bc




d,τ) − mc] (6)
where δ is the discount factor. The expected payoﬀ streams to u and d for
deviating in year t equal:
E(Πn
u,t) = Bn



















d,τ) − mc] (8)
The diﬀerences, Du and Dd, equal the net present value (NPV) of deviating








u,τ) − mc] (9)





d,τ) + mc] (10)
follower. This would, however, not change the general results.
8From equation (9) it follows that Du is determined by the diﬀerence be-
tween beneﬁts of non-cooperative and cooperative play in year t, plus a
“punishment” term that has a constant (negative) expected value. From
equation (10) it follows that Dd is independent from the level of Qt, hence
constant, for a given probability distribution of Q. Because Dd is negative
at Qt = E(Qt)—an agreement would not be signed if Dd ≥ 0 at the expected
value of river ﬂow—it is negative for any Qt. Therefore, in the remainder
of this paper, we will focus only on u’s incentive to deviate.
The type of punishment used here diﬀers from Bennett and Howe [7],
who used monetary penalties in their analysis of cooperation between US
states. We assume here that there is no authority that can issue this type
of penalties when a dispute occurs between nations, a characteristic of
many international agreements. In an overview of existing agreements on
transboundary freshwater, Beach et al. [6] show that in half of the agree-
ments, disputes are handled by advisory councils, governments’ conﬂict-
addressing bodies, the United Nations or other third parties. The other half
of the agreements does not refer to any form of dispute resolution. The
absence of a higher level authority that can issue penalties is clear; hence a
reasonable punishment is non-cooperative behaviour by the other country.
3 Analysing stability
The folk theorem tells us that cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium
as long as punishments are severe enough. When discounted payoﬀs of co-
operation outweigh the sum of discounted payoﬀs of deviation in one year
and Nash-payoﬀs during the subsequent punishment phase, an agreement
is said to be stable.
9Because of the uncertainty of payoﬀs in this model, through the stochas-
tic variable Q, it is not possible to assess whether cooperation is stable or
not. It is, however, possible to assess the probability of stability. To do this,
we need to determine a threshold value of Qt, for which the agreement is
stable in year t; i.e. where both Du and Dd are non-positive. Let ˆ Q be this
threshold level. Because Dd is always negative, ˆ Q denotes the level of Q
for which Du = 0. From equation (9) it follows that ˆ Q depends on both u’s
beneﬁt function and the punishment term and is therefore constant. We can
safely assume that ˆ Q < E(Qt) because an agreement would not be signed if
Du ≥ 0 at the expected value of river ﬂow. With ˆ Q known, we can express
the probability of stability as Pr[Qt ≥ ˆ Qt]. Given that f(Q) is the probabil-
ity density function of Q, we can calculate Pr[Qt ≥ ˆ Qt] as the area under
f(Q) where Q ≥ ˆ Q. Hence, the probability of stability of an agreement
equals 1−F( ˆ Q), see ﬁgure 1. In the remainder of this paper we will use this




1 −F( ˆ Q)
Figure 1: Stability is calculated as 1 − F( ˆ Q).
10WeareinterestedinprobabilitydensityfunctionsofQwithoutandwith
climate change. A comparison of the stability in each situation shows how
climate change aﬀects the stability of cooperation. Because ˆ Q is constant,
we can compare stability of an agreement for f(Q) (no climate change) and
f0(Q) (climate change). Stability in a situation with climate change is lower
when F0( ˆ Q) > F( ˆ Q). Climate change is expected to aﬀect river ﬂow through
the combined eﬀects of changes in temperature, evaporation, soil moisture,
and precipitation. Two general results of climate simulation models are
(i) increased runoﬀ variability, both within seasons and within years, and
(ii) an increase of river ﬂow in cold river basins and a decrease in warmer
regions [cf.3, 38]. For theprobability distributionofQthis impliesa change
in the variance of river ﬂow or a change in the mean of river ﬂow. Their
eﬀectsonstabilitydependonwhethertheyaﬀectthesizeofthearea1−F( ˆ Q).
Both for a mean-preserving spread and for a decrease in mean river ﬂow
this area decreases in size, which negatively aﬀects stability.
Result 1 Stability of a water allocation agreement depends on the probability
density function of river ﬂow. It decreases if this density function changes by a
mean-preserving spread or a decrease in mean river ﬂow.
Weexpectthestabilityofcooperationtobediﬀerentfordiﬀerentsharing
rules. To verify this expectation, we compare ˆ Q for the three sharing rules.
In the comparison, we set αE(Qt) = β = E(Qt) − γ, such that at Qt = E(Qt)
the water allocation is similar for each sharing rule. In calculating ˆ Q from
equation (9) we can ignore the punishment term, because it is equal for all
three sharing rules. We can also ignore Bn
u,t, because it is equal for all three
sharing rules. Hence, we only have to compare cooperative beneﬁts Bc
u,t.
There are two situations when Bc
u,t is not equal for all three sharing rules: if
Qt < E(Qt) and if Qt > E(Qt). Because we assume that ˆ Q < E(Qt), we only
11look at the situation where Qt < E(Qt).




u and hence ˆ QFD > ˆ QPA > ˆ QFU. Because stability is
deﬁned as 1 − F( ˆ Q), we observe that stability is highest for FU and lowest
for FD. This result is a direct consequence of the amount of risk connected
to low ﬂows that is allocated to u. For FU, this risk is minimized as u
receives a ﬁxed amount of water, constrained only by the amount of river
ﬂowavailable. ForFD,theriskismaximizedbecauseifriverﬂowdecreases
by one unit, the allocation to u may also decrease by one unit. For PA, the
risk lies somewhere between those of FU and FD.
Result 2 Stability of a water allocation agreement depends on the sharing rule. It
is higher for ﬁxed upstream allocation than for proportional allocation and lowest
for ﬁxed downstream allocation.
Taking a closer look at FU, we ﬁnd that Du is maximized at Qt ≥ ¯ qu,t. To
see this, using equation (9), note that we can ignore the punishment term






for FU. There are three possibilities:
1. if Qt < β < ¯ qu,t then qn
u,t = Qt and qc
u,t = Qt;
2. if β < Qt < ¯ qu,t then qn
u,t = Qt and qc
u,t = β;
3. if ¯ qu,t ≤ Qt then qn
u,t = ¯ qu,t and qc
u,t = β.
Clearly, in the last situation, equation (11) is maximized. We argue that
the last situation includes Qt = E(Qt), because we assume that ¯ qu,t ≤ E(Qt).
12This assumption is based on the idea that in the short term, u’s economy
and infrastructure are not designed to abstract and use (much) more water
than is expected in a given year.3 Because we may assume that Du < 0 for
Qt = E(Qt), we know that Du < 0 for any level of Qt. It follows that ˆ Q does
not exist for FU. Hence 1 − F( ˆ Q) equals one; FU is stable.
Result 3 Water allocation agreements with ﬁxed upstream allocation are stable
for any level of river ﬂow.
Because FU is stable for any level of river ﬂow, we will focus on PA and
FD only in the next section.
4 Numerical example
To illustrate the results of the model, we use the following numerical exam-
ple:
Bi,t = aqi,t − bq2
i,t E(Qt) = 40
a = 80 α = 0.5
b = 1.5 β = 20
δ = 0.95 γ = 20
n = 5  = 0.5
Thevaluesforα,β,andγarechosensuchthatatQt = E(Qt)thewateralloca-
tion is similar for each sharing rule. Because the countries have symmetric
beneﬁt functions, the allocation is optimal when Qt = E(Qt).4 Further-
3If ¯ qu,t  E(Qt), FU is unstable for Qt large enough.
4Becausethecountrieshavesymmetricbeneﬁtfunctionsinthisexample, PAwillprovide
amoreeﬃcientallocationthanFUorFDwhenclimatechangeeﬀectsoccur: thetotalbeneﬁts
of water use are maximized. This property of the model is similar to results from eﬃciency
studies that were surveyed in the introductory section of this paper [cf. 8].
13more, for each sharing rule, cooperation is attractive to both countries for
Qt = E(Qt), because countries would never agree to cooperate if there was
no expected gain from cooperation.
















Figure 2: Du (NPV of deviating to u) for diﬀerent levels of Qt and diﬀerent
sharing rules.
Figure 2 plots Du for diﬀerent levels of Qt, for the three sharing rules.
Two interesting aspects can be observed in ﬁgure 2. First, looking at the FU
curve, we can observe that indeed Du < 0 for any level of Qt and that Du
is maximized at Qt ≥ ¯ qu,t. Second, we observe that the point where the FD
curve crosses the horizontal axis ( ˆ QFD = 32.9) lies to the right of the point
where the PA curve crosses the horizontal axis ( ˆ QPA = 25.6), hence, PA is
more stable than FD. The decrease of Du for Qt less than ±20 is caused by
the decreasing gain of deviation relative to the punishment.
The stability of cooperation depends on the probability distribution of
Q. In this example we use the gamma distribution to describe f(Q) and
f0(Q), which is an appropriate and commonly applied distribution in the
literature on probabilistic hydrological forecasting [9, 33].
14Theeﬀectofachangeinthemeanorvarianceofriverﬂowonthestability
of cooperation is shown in ﬁgure 3, for both PA and FD. The mean river
ﬂowreferstothemeanof f0(Q), theprobabilitydensityfunctionofQt when
climate change eﬀects occur.5 Two interesting aspects can be observed in
ﬁgure 3. First, the ﬁgure illustrates for selected levels of mean and variance
that FD is less stable than PA. Second, when the mean ﬂow is higher than
ˆ Qt—which seems realistic given that E(Q) = 40—both a decrease in mean
river ﬂow and an increase in variance of river ﬂow decreases stability.























































(b) Fixed downstream allocation
Figure 3: Stability (1 − F( ˆ Q)) of an agreement when climate change aﬀects
the mean river ﬂow or the variance of river ﬂow. Mean and variance are
based on f0(Q), the probability density function of Qt when climate change
eﬀects occur.
5ThecalculationofexpectedbeneﬁtsisstillbasedonE(Q) = 40—themeanoftheoriginal
probability density function f(Q)—because the agreement will not be immediately adapted
at the ﬁrst signs of climate change eﬀects on river ﬂow. Governments need reliable infor-
mation before they are willing to change conditions of this type of agreements; long-term
observations are needed before a change in the probability distribution of river ﬂow can be
assessed.
155 Punishment and asymmetry
In this section, we assess the eﬀects on stability of two interesting factors:
alternative punishment strategies, and asymmetry in beneﬁt functions and
political power. For both factors we assess how they aﬀect stability.
5.1 Alternative punishment strategies
We have argued that the only possible punishment for deviation by the
other country is a trigger strategy of non-cooperative play for p periods.
Variations on this type of punishment are possible. A ﬁrst example is tit-
for-tat, where the period of punishment depends on the behaviour of the
other country. If u deviates p consecutive years, the punishment period is
also p years. A second example is a grim trigger strategy where the period
of punishment is inﬁnite. Both strategies and other variations, however, are
similar to the strategy described above, with p = 1 and p = ∞ respectively.
More interesting punishment strategies may arise when the issue of
water allocation is linked to an other transboundary issue between the two
countries[18]. Inthegameonwaterallocation, disthecountrythatbeneﬁts
most from cooperation. For issue linking to be most eﬀective, this game
should be linked to a game where u can beneﬁt more than d [25], a good
example of which is the facilitation of river transport by d to u. It is clear
that the punishment term may increase when the two games are linked, as
long as the beneﬁts of river navigation to u are suﬃciently large.
Fromtheseexamplesitbecomesclearthatalternativepunishmentstrate-
gies change the size of the punishment term (denoted by θ). To assess the
eﬀect of alternative punishment strategies, we take the derivative of equa-




An increase of θ leads to a similar increase of Du, decreasing the stability
for each level of river ﬂow.6 This result holds for each sharing rule. The
implication of this result is that for any agreement, the higher the absolute
value of the punishment term, the higher the stability of cooperation.
5.2 Asymmetry
We consider both asymmetry in political power and asymmetry in beneﬁt
functions.
Asymmetry in political power As exempliﬁed by the Nile basin and de-
scribed by LeMarquand [30], the distribution of political power has impli-
cationsfortheincentivesforcooperation. Inthismodel, wecanincorporate
this aspect through the level of , which we deﬁne here to be a measure of
political power for the upstream country. When beneﬁt functions are sym-
metric, Kilgour and Dinar [27] have shown that in an eﬃcient situation, the
surplus beneﬁt is equally shared between the two countries; in our model
this implies that  = 0.5.
When < 0.5, dhasmorepoliticalpowerthanuandthereforeastronger
bargaining position. As a result, the non-water transfer from d to u is lower
than in a situation with equally distributed political power. To assess the
eﬀect of political power on stability, we take the derivative of equation (9)
6Note that θ is negative, so an increase of θ is a lower punishment.





























beneﬁts outweigh the expected non-cooperative beneﬁts. An increase of 
leads to a decrease of Du, increasing the stability for each level of river ﬂow.
This result holds for each sharing rule. The implication of this result is that
for any agreement, the larger the political power of u relative to the political
power of d, the higher the stability of cooperation. The intuition behind this
result is that when  is high, the non-water transfer is high, and therefore
cooperation is attractive to u. Changes in the distribution of political power
after an agreement has been signed have no eﬀect on stability because the
eﬀect of  on Du works via mc, which has been ﬁxed.
Asymmetryinbeneﬁtfunctions Asymmetryinbeneﬁtfunctionsbetween
countries is assessed using the same functional form of the beneﬁt function
astheoneintroducedinsection4. Theeﬀectofasymmetricbeneﬁtfunctions






and Bd,t = aqd,t − bq2
d,t. To assess the eﬀect on stability, we
























































































Equation (14) yields a positive value because for u, the non-cooperative
beneﬁts outweigh the cooperative beneﬁts, both at current and expected
levels of river ﬂow. An increase of η leads to an increase of Du, decreasing
the stability for each level of river ﬂow. This result holds for each sharing
rule. The implication of this result is that for any agreement, the higher the
beneﬁts of water use to u compared with those to d, the lower the stability
of cooperation.
Changes in η after an agreement has been signed can also be calculated.
Such a change may occur because of demographic or economic develop-
ments. This eﬀect does not inﬂuence mc, because mc has been ﬁxed in the
agreement. Therefore, to assess the eﬀect on stability, we analyse how η
aﬀects Du by taking the derivative of equation (9) with respect to η, similar































Equation (16) also yields a positive value. An increase of η after an agree-
ment has been signed leads to an increase of Du, decreasing the stability
for each level of river ﬂow. This result holds for each sharing rule. The
implication of this result is that for any agreement, if beneﬁts to u increase
after the agreement has been signed, the stability of cooperation decreases.
6 Discussion
The analysis presented here shows that climate change aﬀects the stability
ofwaterallocationagreements. Thepreciseeﬀectonstabilitydependson(i)
the characteristics of the river basin: its hydrological regime and the eﬀects
of climate change on river ﬂow, and (ii) the characteristics of the agree-
ment: in particular the sharing rule, the countries’ beneﬁt functions, and
the distribution of political power. Because the results show that stability
decreases when water becomes more scarce, this result is mostly relevant
for arid regions. It is less relevant for humid regions and not relevant for
regions facing (only) water quality issues: the impact of climate change on
water quality is too complicated in hydrological terms to be captured in a
simple model as the one presented here.
Toshowhowtheresultscanbeusedwediscussexistingwaterallocation
agreements in three river basins, the Nile river basin, the Orange river
basin, and the South Saskatchewan river basin. For each agreement we
20identifysomekeycharacteristics. Basedonthesecharacteristics,weprovide
conclusions on the stability of these agreements, building on the results of
this paper.
Nile river basin The Nile river basin knows cooperation in water alloca-
tion between Sudan (upstream) and Egypt (downstream), in the form of
the Nile Waters Agreement, signed in 1929 and 1959. Although the vast
majority of river ﬂow is generated in Ethiopia, a lack of infrastructure and
a dispute on its historical rights makes that Ethiopia hardly uses Nile wa-
ter, leaving the majority for Egypt and Sudan. The average available river
ﬂow of 74 000 million cubic meters per year (MCM/yr) is allocated using a
sharing rule that mixes ﬁxed and proportional allocations [35]. Based on
acquired rights, 48 000 MCM/yr is allocated to Egypt and 4 000 MCM/yr to
Sudan. Of the remaining ﬂow, 34% is allocated to Egypt and 66% to Sudan.
In an average year this gives Egypt 55 500 MCM/yr. Because almost 90%
of this expected allocation is ﬁxed, we can safely consider this a FD sharing
rule.
Egypt,beingthedownstreamcountry,isnotpayinganon-watertransfer
to Sudan. In 1959, Egypt paid Sudan a one-time transfer of 15 million
Egyptian Pounds compensation for increased storage in the Sudd el Aali
reservoir that was required in the agreement [35]. Until 1977, however,
Sudan could not fully use its entitlement, so it decided to make “water
loans” to Egypt of up to 1 500 MCM/yr until 1977. This is the ﬁrst of two
factors that might explain why Egypt is not paying Sudan anything for
passing through the majority of the Nile water; non-water transfers equal
zero. The second factor is the distribution of political power in the Nile
basin. It is evident that Egypt is the strongest country in the Nile basin, in
21political,economicandmilitaryterms. Infact,themilitarythreatthatEgypt
poses to Sudan can be viewed as an equivalent to a non-water transfer [cf.
24].
Agriculture is the main water using sector in both Egypt and in Su-
dan. Because developments in irrigation techniques are nearly complete in
Egypt, while Sudan still lacks the resources to expand its irrigated area [42],
average yields are much higher in Egypt [16]. Hence, beneﬁts of water use
are higher in Egypt than in Sudan.
Studies of climate change eﬀects on the hydrology of the Nile river
basin ﬁnd diﬀerent results. Some models predict decreases while others
predict increases in river ﬂow [22]. Arnell [2] and Voss et al. [40] predict
that the expected increase of precipitation exceeds the eﬀect of the expected
increase of evaporation in the Nile basin, resulting in a small increase of
river ﬂow by 2050. Results of a study by Arora and Boer [4], by contrast,
show a decreased annual mean ﬂow. Eﬀects on the variance of river ﬂow
are indeterminate.
Putting these observations into the perspective of the model developed
in this paper, we can conclude that the stability of cooperation in the Nile
basin between Egypt and Sudan is negatively aﬀected by its FD sharing
rule. A second negative eﬀect on stability is Egypt’s high political power
compared to Sudan. A positive eﬀect on stability is Egypt’s high beneﬁts
of water use compared to those of Sudan. The stability of this agreement
in the future depends crucially on the eﬀects of climate change, which are
uncertain. Projected increases in population growth, and possible future
waterclaimsmadebyEthiopia[42]aretwofactorsthatarelikelytodecrease
stability. Population growth will increase beneﬁts of water use to Sudan,
increasingitsincentivetodeviate. When,somewhereinthefuture,Ethiopia
22is also allocated a share of the Nile water, increased scarcity in Sudan and
Egypt will increase Sudan’s incentive to deviate even further.
Orange river basin The Orange river basin covers areas of Lesotho, The
Republic of South Africa (RSA), Botswana, and Namibia. The Lesotho
Highlands Water Project (LHWP), signed in 1986, concerns cooperation in
the upper basin between Lesotho (upstream) and RSA (downstream) on
water transfers from the Orange river (known as Senqu in Lesotho) to cover
RSA water deﬁcits. Under the agreement, Lesotho and RSA construct a
number of dams, reservoirs and channel capacity that enable diversions
to RSA as well as capacity to generate hydropower [39]. Lesotho receives
the beneﬁts from hydropower, while RSA receives a minimum allocation
of water that increases over the years, as the project moves forward, from
57MCM/yrin1995to2200MCM/yrafter2020[32]. Ontopofthisminimum
allocation,additionalwaterisdeliveredtoRSAwhenpossible,usingaﬁxed
formula to calculate the water-price.
RSA pays non-water transfers to Lesotho, increasing from e 14 million
in 1998, when actual deliveries started, to e 24 million in 2004, averaging
e 30 000 per MCM [31]. Revenues from hydropower generation are sub-
stantialbutshouldnotbeclassiﬁedasnon-watertransfers, becauseLesotho
has ﬁnanced this part of the project infrastructure.
Lesotho’s geographical location, being completely surrounded by RSA,
makes the country highly dependent on RSA. RSA has more political
power and higher beneﬁts of water use than Lesotho. The development
of Lesotho’s economy is cumbersome; the country cannot use all its avail-
able water resources and there are only limited plans to further develop
irrigation works. Turton [39] states: “The LHWP can, therefore, be seen as a
23viable way for Lesotho to add value to the water that would otherwise ﬂow onto
RSA’s soil. . . ”.
In general, predictions of climate change eﬀects in Southern Africa in-
dicate reduced precipitation and an increase of evaporation [22]. There is,
however, some uncertainty for the Orange river basin. Although Arnell
[2] ﬁnds that there is a great reduction in runoﬀ by the year 2050 in South-
ern Africa, predictions for the Orange river basin do not clearly indicate
whether and how mean and variance of river ﬂow will change [21]. Nev-
ertheless, current river ﬂow in the Orange river basin knows already large
variability [14].
Putting these observations into the perspective of the model developed
inthispaper,wecanconcludethatthestabilityofcooperationintheOrange
river basin between Lesotho and RSA could be negatively aﬀected by its
FD sharing rule, but it is not, because Lesotho’s demand for water lies far
below its available resources. Positive eﬀects on stability are provided by
(i) the hydropower beneﬁts that Lesotho generates within the project, (ii)
Lesotho’sdependenceonrevenuesfromRSA’snon-watertransfers,and(iii)
RSA’s high beneﬁts of water use compared to Lesotho. The stability of this
agreement in the future can only be aﬀected by climate change if Lesotho’s
economy develops such that its demand for water increases sharply.
South Saskatchewan river basin The South Saskatchewan river is shared
bytheCanadianprovincesofAlberta(upstream)andSaskatchewan(down-
stream). Although the river basin is not an international one, the provinces
in Canada have a high level of autonomy, which allows for a discussion
of our results. The Master Agreement on Apportionment provides guide-
lines for the sharing of the waters of eastward ﬂowing inter-provincial
24streams, including the South Saskatchewan river. The agreement compre-
hends a proportional allocation of the river ﬂow, with 50% allocated to each
province, subject to a mimimum ﬂow requirement at the boundary of 42.5
m3/s [37].
Saskatchewan is not paying a non-water transfer to Alberta. There is
no need for such a transfer because up to now, water use in the South
Saskatchewan river basin has not been limited by water availability. Al-
berta, therefore, has always met its obligation to pass on 50% of river ﬂow.
In recent years, however, water use is getting close to 50% of river ﬂow
in Alberta, partly due to Alberta’s fast growing economy. Water use in
Saskatchewan is much lower and increasing at a lower rate.
Two distinct trends aﬀect water availability in the basin. On the one
hand, climate change eﬀects are projected to decrease mean river ﬂow by
4–10% and to decrease low ﬂow levels by 14–22% by 2046. On the other
hand, the combined eﬀects of population growth, economic growth, and
increasing irrigation eﬃciency are projected to increase water use. With
lower water availability and increasing water use, Alberta is expected to
face water shortage in the coming decades [11].
Political power of Alberta and Saskatchewan, both being Canadian
provinces, can be considered equal. Beneﬁts of water use are higher in
Alberta because of its larger demand for water. Putting these observations
into the perspective of the model developed in this paper, we can conclude
that the current stability of cooperation in the South Saskatchewan river
basin between Alberta and Saskatchewan is high, because both provinces
arenotusingtheirtotalallocation. Inthecomingdecades,however,the50%
constraint to Alberta will become binding, giving the province an incentive
to deviate. Because the agreement does not have an enforcement mech-
25anism and no non-water transfer is being paid by Saskatchewan, Alberta
is likely to deviate and use more than 50% of river ﬂow; the agreement’s
stability is decreasing. Renegotiation of the treaty seems desirable, with ei-
ther Alberta being allocated a larger share of river ﬂow or, if Saskatchewan
insists on its 50% share, Saskatchewan paying for its share of water.
Besides economic gain, there are other issues that inﬂuence the allocation
of water to riparian countries and hence the stability of cooperation. First,
as the example of the Nile river basin points out, acquired water rights can
be important determinants in the allocation of river water. A sharing rule
based on acquired rights is not expected to be optimal from the points of
view of eﬃciency and stability. Second, risk aversion might play a role. A
countryreceivingaﬁxedallocationfacesalowerriskofﬂowvariabilitythan
a country that receives a non-ﬁxed allocation or a proportional allocation
[cf. 8]. We expect stability to be positively aﬀected by risk aversion as risk
aversecountrieswouldappraisethecertitudeofcooperativebeneﬁtsabove
non-cooperative beneﬁts more than risk neutral countries.
Two approaches could be used to decrease the risk associated with low
ﬂows and generate more stable agreements. First, both u and d could
decide to invest in reservoir capacity. When managed properly, reservoirs
can provide a buﬀer in water supply, decreasing the dependency on river
ﬂow in low ﬂow years. Second, a water market could be coupled to an
agreement to enable water trading during low ﬂow years [cf. 10]. Water
markets can improve the eﬃciency of existing water allocations such that
both countries would beneﬁt. Both approaches reduce the incentive to
break an existing agreement.
In theory, the use of punishment strategies enhances cooperation in a
26repeatedgame. Inourmodel,however,punishmentofubydalsodecreases
beneﬁts to d, because the non-cooperative outcome gives d lower beneﬁts
than the cooperative outcome. Shortening the period of punishment is
thereforealwaysbeneﬁcialtod, whichunderminesitscredibilityofactually
going to punish in case of deviation by u. It is this lack of credibility of
punishment strategies that might obstruct the eﬀective use of punishment
strategies in international agreements on water allocation [12]. Ideally,
punishment is implemented in a linked game, which does not aﬀect the
beneﬁts of the punishing country. Again, the facilitation of river transport
by d to u is a good example.
Mendelsohn and Bennett [34] ﬁnd that the impact of climate change on
themeanofriverﬂowisafarmoreimportantdeterminantforeﬃciencythan
its impact on the variance of river ﬂow. For both the Nile and Orange river
basin discussed above, where model predictions on the mean river ﬂow
are not distinct, this implies that the expected eﬃciency of the agreement
is not expected to change because of climate change. Our model suggests
that, although this conclusion may hold for eﬃciency, it does not hold for
the stability of cooperation. Stability is aﬀected by changes in both mean
and variance of river ﬂow. Hence, both the mean and variance of river
ﬂow have to be taken into account when negotiating agreements on water
allocation.
7 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to assess the stability of water allocation
agreementswhenclimatechangeaﬀectsriverﬂow. Agametheoreticmodel
is constructed that analyses the stability of cooperation in water allocation
27betweentwocountriesforthreesharingrules. Thestabilityofcooperationis
expressed in terms of the probability that one of the two countries deviates
from the speciﬁed agreement actions, given that the countries maximize
their expected payoﬀ stream (consisting of beneﬁts of water use and non-
water transfers).
Deviation from agreement actions is found unattractive to the down-
stream country (d) for each sharing rule. Therefore, stability only depends
on the probability of deviation by the upstream country (u). Of the three
sharing rules that were analysed, the ﬁxed upstream allocation was found
stable for any level of river ﬂow (Qt). For low levels of Qt, however, both
with ﬁxed downstream allocation and proportional allocation, u may have
an incentive to deviate. The stability of agreements with these sharing rules
depends on the probability distribution of Q. Results showed that both a
decrease in mean river ﬂow and an increase in variance of river ﬂow de-
crease the stability of cooperation. Agreements with PA are in general more
stable than agreements with FD, because with FD, u bears a larger part of
the risk connected to low ﬂows.
InadditiontotheprobabilitydistributionofQandthesharingrule,three
other factors are identiﬁed to aﬀect stability of cooperation. The stability
of cooperation is higher (i) if the absolute value of the punishment term is
higher, (ii) if u’s political power is large relative to d’s political power, and
(iii) if u’s beneﬁts of water use are low relative to d’s beneﬁts.
Thispapershowsthatthestabilityofwaterallocationagreementscanbe
aﬀected by climate change. This paper adds to the analysis of water alloca-
tionagreementsbyfocusingonstabilityaspects, whereothershavefocused
on eﬃciency aspects. Where Bennett et al. [8] found that proportional al-
locations are more eﬃcient in many situations, we ﬁnd that proportional
28allocations are less stable than ﬁxed upstream allocations. Where Mendel-
sohn and Bennett [34] found that the largest impact of climate change on
eﬃciency comes from changes in the mean of river ﬂow, we ﬁnd that both
changes in mean and variance aﬀect stability. Because water allocation
agreements need to be stable in order to increase the eﬃciency of water use,
the results of this paper are important for the design of water allocation
agreements and especially the selection of a sharing rule.
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